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INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES
The solution to the "delegation problem" is
political, not constitutional
Abdication or Delegation?
Congress, the Bureaucracy,
and the Delegation Dilemma
BY MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS INCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERAL GOV-
ernment, a large number and wide variety of exec-
utive branch organizations have been created to
implement and execute laws. The organizations
range from cabinet departments to agencies, national institutes, and independent commissions. Each possesses its own
rules and routines, and each is responsible for a unique set of policies. Moreover, from the beginning of the Republic, Con-
gress has relied on officials of the executive branch to fill in the details of legislation at their discretion. That is, Congress
has delegated legislative authority to the executive
branch.
A first proposition of many who oppose the delega-
tion of legislative authority is that it is prohibited by the
Constitution, in particular by the separation of powers
embodied in the Constitution. That proposition has its
roots in contractarian political theory, which argues that
the consent of the governed-manifested in a popularly
elected legislature-is the only legitimate basis for the
exercise of the government's coercive power. Nonelected
federal officials should therefore be given the least possi-
ble room for discretion or interpretation in carrying out
the laws of the land. To that end, the Jeffersonians, for
example, thought it imperative that Congress write con-
crete and specific statutes, that allowing administrators
wide latitude in interpreting the law was to allow them to
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make the law. The Jeffersonians' belief became known as
the "nondelegation doctrine."
DELEGATION AS SEEN BY ITS OPPONENTS
Constitutional Objections The Jeffersonians' antipathy to
delegation did not halt its spread, however. In The End of
Liberalism, Theodore Lowi documents the gradual growth
of public control of the economy. Beginning in the late
1880s, the federal government began to regulate the rail-
roads, moved quickly to the trusts with the Sherman Act
and its enforcement, and eventually to the quality of
goods. At the start of the First World War, the federal gov-
ernment had established itself in the regulation of com-
merce with the formation of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and Federal Commerce Commission. In the New
Deal era, the federal government moved into the regula-
tion of factors of production (through such agencies as
the National Labor Relations Board) and markets (through
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the Securities and Exchange Commission, for example).
The growth of the federal government's regulatory activi-
ties-and the attendant growth of the federal bureaucra-
cy-was bolstered in this century by the gradual over-
turning of the nondelegation doctrine in the courts.
To many critics of legislative delegation, the growth
of the federal bureaucracy has been irresponsible, as del-
egations to agencies have become ever more general. In
the critics' view those sweeping
delegations of authority represent
a colossal failure of institutional
nerve. Facing public clamor to do Ma
something about such pressing
problems as the safety of food or the a
drug products, but unable to agree
on precisely how to solve the prob- non
lems, Congress repeatedly has
passed the buck by establishing
more federal agencies.
Other critics contend that Con-
gress's proclivity to delegate law
making to nonelected administrators has been surpassed
only by the amount of discretion conveyed by delegation.
A full-blown administrative state had become
entrenched by the end of the New Deal, as agencies' char-
ters had become litanies of noble-sounding sentiments
devoid of specific instructions.
Many critics have called for a dismantling of the
administrative state and for a revival of the nondelegation
doctrine in the federal courts. But both the delegation of
authority and its redelegation are facts of modern life. As
Gary Lawson notes in the preceding article, "No one seri-
ously doubts the outcome of a showdown, in any author-
itative forum, between the Constitution and the modern
state. Quite simply, the nation has chosen administrative
governance over a Constitution that was designed pre-
cisely to prevent any such outcome."
What about Efficiency? Delegating to "experts" is a ubiqui-
tous feature of our affairs, both public and private, as Law-
son also recognizes by citing both the Supreme Court's
admission in Mistretta v. United States and James Landis's
acknowledgment that delegation and redelegation are
often necessary to capture the efficiencies gained by spe-
cialization and the division of effort. If we want efficient
government, then the interesting question is not whether
delegation should be restricted or forbidden but whether
it can be managed so that it is responsible and accountable
to elected office holders and, in turn, to the people.
Naturally, there is some disagreement about the
answer to that question. Some critics are troubled by
what they see as a lack of congressional oversight. Fisher,
in lamenting the lack of oversight, has offered an expla-
nation. He observes that the benefits derived from over-
sight are collective goods. Consequently, members of
Congress lack individual incentives to engage in over-
sight. Additionally, the operations of the federal govern-
ment have become so complex that it is unrealistic to
believe in the possibility of effective oversight. The field is
clear for government by experts rather than by elected
office holders.
Special Interests and Collusion Others express concern
about the potential for special interests to dominate
agencies' deliberations. In his examination of the rise of
the administrative state, Lowi contends that
ny critics have called for a dismantling of
dministrative state and for a revival of the
delegation doctrine. But the delegation of
authority is a fact of modern life.
parceling out policymaking power to the most inter-
ested parties tends strongly to destroy political
responsibility. A program split off with a special
imperium to govern itself is not merely an admin-
istrative unit; it is a structure of power with impres-
sive capacities to resist central political control.
(p. 59)
By assigning specialized jurisdictions to bureaus,
Congress reduces the number of organized interests that
have the interest and ability to contest a specific policy
issue, thereby creating a situation of oligopoly.
Lowi further argues that
actual policymaking will not come from voter pref-
erences or congressional enactments but from a
process of tripartite bargaining between the spe-
cialized administrators, relevant members of
Congress, and the representatives of self-select-
ed organized interests. (p. xii)
There are two key reasons why special interests
might come to dominate policymaking. First, adminis-
trators depend on industry cooperation and informa-
tion to achieve their goals. To obtain such cooperation
requires them to ensure against dislocations by adopt-
ing conservative policies. Second, because agencies'
resources are limited relative to those of the industries
they are regulating, too adversarial a stance would
result in legal fees that quickly exhaust agencies' bud-
gets. (A third, somewhat related reason could be that
Congress loses control of policy because agencies'
interests conflict with those of Congress, which cannot
effectively oversee the vast number of agencies and
their complex workings.)
But many critics of delegation see a problem that is
potentially even more insidious than a lack of oversight
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or the capture of agencies by interest groups. Scholars Agency losses o
have argued since the 1930s that executive agencies, reg- 0 The agent
ulated interests, and congressional committees and sub- pal delegate
committees collude in making policy. Such arrange- without gett
ments, which mirror the "military-industrial complex" of
which President Eisenhower spoke, have been called both The principa
"subgovernments" and "iron triangles." In them, agencies respond to a
are nurtured and funded by Congress, interest groups
receive influence over policy from agencies, and mem- *There is a c
bers of congressional committees receive financial and and the age
electoral support from interest groups. ests-or sha
then the agel
THE DELEGATION DILEMMA AND THE the principal
PROBLEM OF AGENCY
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE EXECU- the prncs
tive thus poses a dilemma. To capture the benefits of spe- the aget
cialization and division of effort, members of Congress iml ovet
must delegate some control to executive agencies. But
An agency may be able to sustain its policy
against an override or other form of punishment
simply by pleasing a single "veto player" (a party
capable of blocking legislation).
that delegation may in turn harm the public interest become law reqi
because the agencies may be both unaccountable and the House and 
captive to special interests, dent or, if he vet(
Congress nevertheless has opted in favor of delega- bers of both cha
tion. Must delegation necessarily lead to the abdication of Because all
public authority over policymnaking? tion (including 1
Delegation is ubiquitous in both private and public the. agency may
life. In many situations, from visiting the doctor to send- activity-even
ing our kids to school, we delegate to others because of agency's advan
their expertise or comparative advantage. Redelegation is agency's uncon
also ubiquitous; for example, the doctors to whom we on the extent to
delegate authority to ensure our health may in turn The agency ma
assign some tasks to a specialist, override or oth(
We can think abstractly about delegation as a "princi- ing a single "ve
pal-agent problem." The principal is the person who legislation).
wants a task performed; the agent is the person to whom
the principal delegates authority to complete the task. EX POST POLITI
The principal delegates because he perceives an advan- AGENCIES' ACTI
tage in drawing on'the agent's specialization or expertsse. adjudicating cas
But delegation also has disadvantages, namely, gressional overs
agency losses and agency costs. Agency losses are seen as unaccou
incurred when an agent's choices are suboptimal from sion, the decisic
the principal's perspective. Agency costs include direct always overturn
costs (an agent's salary and expenses, for example) and Even when Con
the pecuniary and opportunity costs of managing and Sion, however, t
overseeing an agent's actions. ate incentives fo
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ccur when three conditions are met:
has agenda control. That is, the princi-
s to the agent the authority to act
ing the principal's consent in advance.
I is then in the position of having to
n action after the fact (ex post), rather
ble to veto it before the fact (ex ante).
onflict ofinterest between the principal
nt. (If the two have the same inter-
re some common goals, at least-
nt will likely choose an outcome that
finds satisfactory.)
pal must lack an effective check on
ctions; that is, the principal cannot
urn a decision after the agent makes
nally the lack of an effective check is
said to result from the princi-
pal's inability to evaluate the
performance of an agent who
was chosen, in the first place,
to provide expertise the princi-
pal does not have.
Further, members of Congress
may lack an effective check on
agency decisionmaking because of
the separation of powers in the
American Constitution, which sets
up the so-called "multiple princi-
pal" problem. For a proposal to
uires the consent of at least a majority in
enate and the concurrence of the presi-
oes a bill, the consent of additional mem-
mbers.
of the principals must agree to legisla-
egislation to check an agency's actions)
be unconstrained within a sphere of
if all the principals can overcome the
tage in expertise. The scope of the
strained sphere of activity will depend
which the principals' interests conflict.
be able to sustain its policy against an
er form of punishment simply by pleas-
to player" (a party capable of blocking
CAL CONTROL OF POLICYMAKING
ONS, SUCH AS PROPOSING RULES AND
es, often are taken without apparent con-
ight, and agencies therefore tend to be
ntable. But when an agency makes a deci-
n is not necessarily final. Congress can
the decision by passing new legislation.
gress does not override an agency's deci-
he possibility that it might do so may cre-
r the agency to take into account the pref-
erences of members of Congress. Similarly, the possibili-
ty of a reward or sanction for an agency's action may also
encourage the agency to respect the wishes of members
of Congress. These possibilities are ex post forms of con-
trol; that is, they are actions that could be taken after an
agency has made a decision. I discuss below how ex post
controls can and do resolve aspects of the delegation
dilemma.
MITIGATING AGENCIES' AGENDA CONTROL AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A MAJOR SOURCE OF THE DELEGATION PROBLEM IS THE
fact that agencies often hold an "institutional" advan-
tage, in that they collectively make myriad decisions
and Congress would have to bear heavy costs to
respond legislatively to those decisions. An agency's
institutional advantage (also known as a "first-mover"
advantage) faces Congress with a potential fait accom-
pli by the agency. Congress may mitigate the institu-
tional advantage by ensuring that there is at least one
other actor with the authority to veto or block the
agency's actions.
Congress, for many years, relied on a variety of ex post
legislative vetoes, which are still used even though the
Supreme Court found them unconstitutional in INS v.
Chadha (1983). According to Louis Fisher, those legislative
vetoes allowed the House and Senate, or either of them,
to veto bureaucratic policy proposals before they were
implemented.
Other ex post mechanisms amount to what Barry
Weingast has called "the big club behind the door." There
are many checks on an agency besides a threat to elimi-
nate it. The enabling legislation that governs delegation to
the agency could permit presidential or congressional
vetoes of proposed rules. Or Congress can simply refuse
to appropriate funds for a proposal, thus undermining
the proposal without rejecting it outright. Congress can
also delegate veto power to other agencies, a point I will
discuss later in describing ex ante control strategies.
In making proposals and engaging in rule making,
bureaucratic agents must anticipate the reaction of
political leaders and accommodate the leaders'
demands and interests. As Weingast notes, "Ex post sanc-
tions ... create ex ante incentives for bureaucrats to serve
congressmen" (p.156). That is, Congress's big club
engenders the well-known law of anticipated reactions-
bureaucrats are aware of the limits of acceptable behav-
ior and know that they risk having their agencies' pro-
grams curtailed or their careers ended if they push too
far beyond those limits.
MITIGATING BUREAUCRATIC EXPERTISE
THE EXPERTISE OF BUREAUCRATS RELATIVE TO THE
expertise of members of Congress is often cited to explain
why a bureaucracy becomes unaccountable to Congress.
But the problem is not that legislators lack information or
that bureaucrats monopolize it. Legislators have access to
many sources of information and expertise outside the
bureaucracy, including legislative staff, interest groups,
and private citizens. Rather, the problem is how to assess
the accuracy of such information.
Contrary to earlier thought, however, legislators need
not master the technical details of policymaking to over-
see effectively an agency's actions. Legislators need only
collect and correlate enough information to infer with
some accuracy whether or not an agency is serving their
interests.
Thomas Schwartz and I have distinguished two types
of oversight: "police patrol" and "fire alarm." In the first
type of oversight, members of Congress actively seek evi-
dence of misbehavior by agencies; that is, the members
exert control by looking for trouble, as do police officers
prowling in a patrol car. In fire-alarm oversight, members
wait for complaints by concerned groups to indicate that
agencies are misbehaving.
Fire-alarm oversight has several characteristics that
are valuable to political leaders. To begin with, leaders do
not have to spend a lot of time looking for trouble. Wait-
ing for trouble to be brought to their attention assures
leaders that the trouble is important to constituents.
Moreover, responding to the complaints of constituents
allows political leaders to claim credit for fixing prob-
lems. In contrast, trouble discovered by actively
patrolling might not be of concern to constituents and
thus of no electoral benefit to members.
Political leaders are therefore likely to prefer the low-
risk, high-reward strategy of fire-alarm oversight to the
riskier and potentially costlier police-patrol system.
Moreover, fire-alarm oversight is likely to be more effec-
tive in securing compliance with legislative goals, for it
brings with it targeted sanctions and rewards. Indeed,
recent research has shown that fire-alarm oversight is the
modal type of congressional oversight.
The U.S. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)
provides several rules for agency decisionmaking:
* An agency cannot announce a new policy
without warning but must instead give notice
that it will consider an issue, and must do so with-
out prejudice or bias in favor of any particular
action.
*Agencies must solicit comments and allow all
interested parties to offer their views.
*Agencies must allow participation in decision-
making processes. (The extent of participation
often is mandated by the statute creating an
agency and by the courts, in their interpretation
of the statute.) When hearings are held, parties
offer testimony and evidence and may often
cross-examine other witnesses.
* Agencies must deal explicitly with the evidence
presented to them and provide a "rationalizable"
link between the evidence and their decisions.
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*Agencies must make available a record of the
final vote of each member in every proceeding.
These requirements facilitate political control of agencies
in five ways:
* An agency cannot conspire to hand elected
officials a fait accompli, that is, a new policy with
already mobilized supporters. Rather, the agency
must announce its intent to consider an issue well
in advance of any decision it may make.
*Agencies must solicit valuable political infor-
mation. The notice and comment provisions of
APA help to ensure that an agency identifies polit-
ical interests relevant to a decision and gains
information about the political costs and benefits
of various actions. Members of Congress do not
pay a political price if that participation is not
universal (or even stacked) because diffuse
groups that fail to participate, even when their
interests are at stake, are much less likely to
become an electoral force than those that do par-
ticipate. Further, because participation is expen-
sive, it serves to indicate the seriousness of a
group's interest in the outcome of the process.
* The entire proceeding is public, and rules
against ex parte contact deter secret deals
between an agency and a constituency it might
seek to mobilize against Congress or the presi-
dent.
* The entire sequence of decisionmaking-
notice, comment, deliberation, collection of evi-
dence, and construction of a record in favor of a
chosen action-affords many opportunities for
political leaders to respond when they dislike the
direction in which an agency seeks to move.
*And, at any point, interested constituents can
activate fire alarms, because the process enables
constituents to gather information about an
agency's behavior and call on members of Con-
gress to intervene.
THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF EX POST CONTROL
ALTHOUGH EX POST CONTROL IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE, IT
requires legislative action. Excepting single-chamber leg-
islative vetoes, any legislative action has to pass through
both chambers of Congress (and their committees) and
survive a presidential veto. Because of the many actors
who must assent to legislative action, the constraints on
an agency are weakened to the extent that there is dis-
agreement between the House, the Senate, and the presi-
dent. To avoid an override of its policy, an agency need
only please one chamber or the president.
Ex post control is therefore a problematic strategy
because, regardless of the facts or the wisdom of an
agency's decisions, Congress may be unable to override
the agency's decisions or punish the agency for them.
EX ANTE POLITICAL CONTROL OF POLICYMAKING
AS THEY CREATE AND FUND AN AGENCY AND MAKE
appointments to it, the president and Congress have
many opportunities to structure the agency's decision-
making so that it is more responsive to their preferences.
I examine several strategies in this section.
Institutional Checks Checks on an agency's agenda-setting
power can be arranged to affect the agency ex ante, that is,
before it makes a proposal, as well as ex post.
An example is the assignment of agenda control to
more than one agency so that one agency cannot domi-
nate a particular policy arena. Moreover, agencies whose
jurisdictions overlap will compete for budgets and statu-
tory authority, making it all the more necessary for them
to please political leaders.
We see examples of these strategies in federal delega-
tions. As originally established, the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health in the Department of
Commerce would first identify a health or safety hazard
in the workplace. Only then could the agency charged
with actually regulating workplace safety, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration in the Depart-
ment of Labor, promulgate a rule regulating the identified
problem.
Stacking the Deck The tools available to political actors for
controlling administrative outcomes through process,
rather than substantive guidance in legislation, are the
procedural details: the relationship of an agency's staff
resources to its domain of authority, the funding avail-
able to finance participation by underrepresented inter-
ests, and the resources devoted to participation by one
agency in the processes of another.
By structuring who gets to make what decisions and
when, and how those decisions are made, Congress and
the president can stack the deck in an agency's decision-
making. For example, all else being equal, elaborate pro-
cedures with strict evidentiary tests and many opportu-
nities for judicial review before a final policy decision is
reached will benefit constituents with ample resources
for representation. The effect of a cumbersome proce-
dure, reinforced by, for instance, the lack of a budget to
subsidize representation of other parties and an indepen-
dent analytical staff in the agency, is to stack the deck in
favor of well-organized, well-financed interests.
A prominent example of deck-stacking is found in
the original procedures established for the U.S. Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). Although
CPSC was responsible for both identifying problems and
proposing regulations, it was required to use an "offeror"
process to contract for rule writing. The cost of contract-
ing for rule writing would exceed the funds available to
CPSC for the entire approval process. Consequently, only
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groups willing to bear the cost of writing regulations
became offerors, and those were the groups most inter-
ested in consumer safety: testing organizations spon-
sored by manufacturers and consumer organizations.
Thus the process effectively removed agenda control
from cPsc and gave considerable power to the entities
most affected by its regulations. In 1981, Congress
amended the process by requiring that trade associations
be given the opportunity to develop voluntary standards
as cPsc identified problems, ensuring that consumer test-
ing organizations could not control cpsc's agenda.
The legislature can also make policy more respon-
sive to politically relevant constituencies by enhancing
their role in agencies' procedures. An example is pro-
vided by the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) of 1969 Environmental and conservation groups
in the United States had become much better organized
and more politically potent in the 1960s. Through
NEPA, Congress required all agen-
cies to file environmental impact
statements on proposed projects,
forcing agencies to assess the
environmental costs of such pro-
jects. NEPA gave environmental either the
interests a new, effective avenue
of participation in agency deci- can
sions and enabled those interests
to join the decision process at a
much earlier point than previous-
ly had been possible.
NEPA also made it easier for
environmental groups to sue federal agencies. NEPA SO
altered the procedures for approving new nuclear-power
projects that construction of new plants was effectively
halted. The 1971 decision in the Calvert Cliffs case required
the Atomic Energy Commission (later the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission) to follow NEPA's regulations, thereby
making environmental impact reports a necessary part
of the approval process. No new nuclear plants were
ordered between 1978 and 1985, and every project
planned after 1974 was cancelled, as were a third of those
planned before 1974.
Deck-stacking also is found in the 1972 California
Coastal Zone Conservation Act (cczA). That statute was
enacted to protect the scenic and environmental
resources along California's coastline, while preserving
public access to beaches. The creation of a permit review
procedure with diffused power instituted a bias against
the approval of new water projects. All six regional
coastal commissions and the statewide coastal commis-
sion must review all permits approved by local govern-
ments. The commissioners' ability to induce compliance
with CCZA is aided by their power to levy substantial fines
against violators of the act. Thus, by carefully writing pro-
cedures into CCZA, the state legislature was able to achieve
its statutory goals even with a broadly stated substantive
mandate to the commissioners.
Burden of Proof Perhaps the most important tool legisla-
tures use to stack the deck in bureaucratic decisionmak-
ing is the placement of the burden of proof. Burden of
proof is a critical element of agency decisionmaking
when an issue before an agency is fraught with uncer-
tainty. In such a circumstance, proving that a regulation
is either necessary or unnecessary can be difficult, if not
impossible. Hence, imposing a rigorous burden of proof
on either the advocates or opponents of a regulation can
ensure that the burdened party cannot attain its preferred
outcome.
For example, the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metics Act of 1938, as amended, requires that before a
pharmaceutical company can market a new drug it must
prove that the drug is both safe and efficacious. By con-
trast, in the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 Con-
gress required that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), before regulating a new chemical, must prove that
Imposing a rigorous burden of proof on
advocates or opponents of a regulation
ensure that the burdened party cannot
attain its preferred outcome.
the chemical is hazardous to human health or the envi-
ronment, otherwise the new chemical may be marketed.
Few new drugs are brought to market in the United States
each year, relative to the rates at which new drugs are
introduced in other countries. By contrast, with the
exception of chemicals deemed to pose an imminent risk
to public health, EPA has not been able to regulate any of
the 50,000 different chemicals that are potentially within
its purview under the Toxic Substances Control Act.
Congress also has successfully modified burdens of
proof to change the effects of regulations. The Kennedy
Amendments to the Civil Aeronautics Act (CAA) are a pri-
mary example of such modifications. Under the original
act, the burden of proof was on a potential entrant into a
particular air-passenger market to show the Civil Aero-
nautics Board that its entry would not damage the com-
petitive position of the carriers already in the market.
Because the point of entering a market is to take the
excess profits of other carriers, the original provision of
CAA limited the growth of competition. The Kennedy
Amendments shifted the burden of proof onto existing
carriers by requiring them to show that new entry would
make their routes unprofitable. And thus were airlines
deregulated.
More recently, when abuses of power by the Internal
Revenue Service gained national prominence, Congress
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again responded by shifting the burden of proof. In that
instance, the burden shifted from the taxpayer, who had
been required to prove that he had not violated tax law, to
the IRS, which now must prove that the taxpayer has vio-
lated the law. Again, changing the administrative process
stacked the deck in favor of one group (taxpayers) and
against another (IRS).
Underlying Agendas Deck-stacking is related to a concept
that Roger Noll, Barry Weingast, and I have called the mir-
roring principle. Political officials can use deck-stacking to
create a decisionmaking environment in which the distri-
bution of influence among constituencies reflects the
political coalition that gave rise to an agency's legislative
mandate. Because procedures rarely change, the influ-
ence of the coalition can persist long after the coalition
The ability to change public policy resi
the ballot box, not in the re-invention c
nondelegation doctrine or the dismantli
federal bureaucracy.
that fomented the legislation has disbanded.
The ultimate aim of deck-stacking is not to preselect
policy but rather to ensure that the winners in the politi-
cal battle over the underlying legislation will also be win-
ners as the program is implemented. By enfranchising
interests that are represented in the legislative majority, a
legislature need not closely supervise the agency to
ensure that it serves the legislature's interests. Thus an
agency's policy can evolve without the passage of new
legislation reflecting changes in the preferences of the
enacting coalition's constituents. (Agencies' internal
structures often mirror the agendas of supporting inter-
ests, just as elected executives often attempt to mirror
outside political and electoral forces in the orders and
rules they impose on the bureaucracy.)
The courts also can play a role in the political con-
trol of the bureaucracy. Enforcement of administrative
procedure can be delegated by the legislature to the
courts, reducing the effort the legislature must make to
ensure the effectiveness of the procedure. If a judicial
remedy is likely when an agency violates its procedures,
then the threat of lawsuits and adverse judgments will
help to ensure that the agency follows its procedural
path and, thus, that the agency's choices will mirror
political preferences, without the need for costly "police
patrol" oversight.
Legislatures can further limit an agency's ability to set
its own agenda by carefully setting the reversionary poli-
cy in the statute that establishes the agency. For example,
in the case of entitlement spending specified by statute,
the administering agency has no discretion in how or to
whom it allocates funds. Another example is the wide-
spread use of the "sunset" provision, whereby an agency's
legal authority expires unless the legislature passes a new
law to renew the agency's mandate.
Since the Republicans took control of both chambers
of Congress following the 1994 election they have
attempted to change the way the deck is stacked with
regard to environmental policy. First, the Republican
Congress proposed requiring cost-benefit analysis of
most federal regulatory activities. Had that proposal suc-
ceeded, its effect would have been to reduce the number
of regulatory actions by agencies. Second, the Republican
Congress attempted to change the definition of takings.
Federal courts had been operating
under a definition that held that a
federal action was not a taking
des in funless the entire value of a proper-
ty was taken from its owner. That
if the definition gave agencies the discre-
tion to take up to nearly the full
ng of the value of a property. The Republi-
cans would have redefined a taking
to constitute any reduction in
value, no matter how small. Such a
change would have stacked the
deck against regulatory action
because it was unlikely that the Republican Congress
would have given agencies more money for the addition-
al compensation that would have been owed to property
owners. In sum, both of the proposed changes would
have been procedural rather than substantive, and it is
likely that both would have favored Republicans' con-
stituents at the expense of other groups.
The actions by the Republican Congress are consis-
tent with a large and growing body of empirical literature
which shows that under certain conditions an agency's
behavior responds to shifts in congressional preferences
without an effort by Congress to force compliance. Barry
Weingast and Mark Moran's seminal article, for example,
shows how the Federal Trade Commission chose to
change its case mix when the relevant Senate committee's
composition changed following the 1978 election.
Iron Triangles Unfortunately, the same literature does little
to resolve the most insidious problem that can afflict del-
egation: the formation of iron triangles. If Congress and
its committees are willing co-conspirators in the capture
of an agency by certain interests, then no amount of evi-
dence about the influence of congressional committees
can assuage fears that the agency's agenda subverts the
public interest.
Congress does attempt to limit the formation of iron
triangles in two ways. First, as Noll, Weingast, and I have
argued, procedures that stack the deck in agencies' deci-
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sionmaking can make it difficult for any interest group,
and even Congress, to change policy in the future. In
other words, Congress can tie its own hands, so that if the
legislative coalition shifts, agency policymaking might
not respond to the shift. Second, as D. Roderick Kiewiet
and I have shown, the controlling committees in Con-
gress-in particular, the budget and appropriations com-
mittees-counteract iron triangles by reducing the sub-
stantive committees' ability to act unilaterally. That is, the
substantive committees are disciplined by the budget and
appropriations committees' ability to constrain, modify,
and reject their proposals. Thus, although the substantive
committees that deal with an agency daily might develop
clientele relationships with the agency, the institutional
checks in the legislative process restrict the substantive
committees' ability to deliver private goods to the agency
or the interest groups it regulates.
CONCLUSION
IN SUM, TWO CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR DELEGA-
tion to fail: principals and agents must have conflicting
interests in the outcome of delegation and principals
must lack an effective check on agents' actions. Princi-
pals may lack an effective check because their agent has
expertise that the principals do not possess or because of
conflicting interests among the principals. Where delega-
tion occurs under such conditions, agents may be free to
take any action that suits them, regardless of the conse-
quences for the principals. Delegation then becomes
abdication.
Arthur Lupia and I have argued that delegation can
succeed when one of two conditions is satisfied. The first
is the knowledge condition, in which the principal, through
his own experience or through knowledge gained from
others, is able to distinguish beneficial and detrimental
agency actions. The second is the incentive condition, which
is satisfied when the agent has an incentive to take
account of the principal's welfare in making his deci-
sions. These two conditions are somewhat intertwined
because a principal who becomes enlightened about the
consequences of delegation can either motivate the agent
to take actions that enhance the principal's welfare or
reject actions by the agent that do not do so.
The institutional settings in which administrative
processes unfold often enable legislators to learn about
their agents' actions and to create incentives for bureau-
cratic compliance. Legislators' implementation of and
reliance on such institutions is essential to successful del-
egation. The day-to-day operation of those institutions is
often unnoted, but the institutions' effects on bureaucrat-
ic output are felt strongly.
I am not arguing that all is well in the Washington
establishment. Delegation does produce agency losses
and does entail agency costs, and the sum of these can
exceed the benefits of delegation. (The interesting ques-
tions are: When does this happen? And how can we tell
when it does?) Federal agencies and departments do
sometimes become the Club Med of the Potomac, or
worse!
Delegation, although problematic in its outcomes, is
not equivalent to the abdication of Congress's law-mak-
ing authority. Members of Congress always incur some
costs-both personal and institutional-to hold the
executive branch accountable for its policy choices
because there are often segments of society-sometimes
even a majority-that dislike those choices. Federal agen-
cies are creatures of Congress and are subject to the stric-
tures of their creator. Questions of policy, then, are more
rightly directed at Congress. The ability to change public
policy resides in the ballot box, not in the re-invention of
the nondelegation doctrine or the dismantling of the fed-
eral bureaucracy.
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